Integrity and Ordinary Morality by Rajczi, Alex
Integrity and Ordinary Morality
Alex Rajczi





According to the moral standards most of us accept and live by, morality generally permits us to refrain from promoting the good of others and instead engage in non-harmful projects of our own choice.​[1]​  This aspect of so-called ‘ordinary morality’ has turned out to be very difficult to justify.  Recently, though, various authors, including Bernard Williams and Samuel Scheffler, have proposed moral theories that would vindicate this aspect of ordinary morality, at least in part.​[2]​  Those theories are Integrity Theories. They are generated by treating as a default some moral theory, like consequentialism, that demands that we do a great deal of good. The theory is then modified so as to make room for individuals to pursue the projects they value most deeply, and perhaps their trivial interests as well—i.e., so as to respect individual integrity.  The result is (allegedly) a theory that contains agent-centered prerogatives to pursue one’s projects and interests rather than the agent-neutral good.  
	Thus described, Integrity Theories don’t fully vindicate every aspect ordinary morality; in fact, they don’t even vindicate every ordinary aspect of agent-centered prerogatives.  Those prerogatives, as ordinary conceived, are not only prerogatives to pursue our projects and interests, but other non-harmful courses of action as well—e.g., lazing on the couch and doing nothing.  Still, Integrity Theories can take us a certain distance toward a vindication of ordinary morality by explaining why we can pursue our own projects and interests rather than the greater good.  
	This paper presupposes that Integrity Theories are correct and that, for the reasons given by others, they can explain why morality should grant us agent-centered prerogatives to pursue our own projects and interests.  The goal is to extend this work in two respects.
	First, it will be shown that previous authors have misunderstood what must be done in order to reconcile integrity theories with ordinary morality.  Ordinary morality is often characterized as giving us broad (though not limitless) permission to do as we like, so long as we are not harming others.  But our intuitions are conflicted on just this point.  On the one hand, we feel that we do not have to promote the good of others but instead may generally spend our time as we want; on the other, we feel that we ought to be doing more to promote the good of others and that our failure to do so is a failure to meet a moral obligation.  It is these conflicted feelings that one must vindicate if one is interested in reconciling an ethical theory with ordinary morality.  Specifically, one must either show that one of the intuitions is false and vindicate the other, or one must explain why the intuitions are both correct but not in conflict, then vindicate them both.   
With this clarification in place, the second goal is to argue that Integrity Theories can vindicate ordinary morality in the sense just defined.  Integrity Theories are distinct from most other ethical theories in that they contain a special kind of obligations—what may be called relievable obligations.  Because of this novel feature, Integrity Theories can explain how our conflicting intuitions could be fundamentally correct and yet not truly contradictory.  In that way, they clarify the content of ordinary morality.  Moreover, Integrity Theories also point to an explanation for why morality should have this conflicted character, and thus vindicate this aspect of ordinary morality, once it is properly understood.
The first task is to say more about ordinary morality and our duty to promote the good of others.


1     Ordinary Morality

This paper will focus on the extent of the requirement to promote the good of others.  Even given this restricted focus, it is probably a mistake to think that there is a conception of morality that is shared by most people.  But insofar as generalizations are possible, one characterization it might be natural to entertain is the following.  Ordinary morality requires that we refrain from many harms, but it less often demands that we do good.  Its positive requirements to promote the good can be roughly summarized in two principles:

i.	We are required to promote the good of others in four circumstances:
a.	We are generally obligated to do what we have agreed to do (even if the agreement is only implicit).
b.	We are often (but not always) obligated to promote the livelihood of people with whom we have certain ‘relationships of chance’—e.g., a familial relationship.
c.	We are generally obligated to produce a great good when we can do so at very little cost and inconvenience (to ourselves or to our nearest and dearest).  
d.	We must spend some time and resources helping the worst off.
ii.	Otherwise, we may engage in non-harmful activities of our own choice.

It is easy to see why some philosophers might accept this characterization of ordinary morality.  These lax standards characterize much of what we might say if asked to describe our moral duties to promote the good, and perhaps more importantly, the lax standards that most of us employ when we decide how to live our lives.  
However, this is not a complete characterization of our pre-theoretic intuitions about morality.  When we focus our attention on certain examples and issues, many of us have seemingly contradictory instincts about the extent of our duties to promote the good of others.  On the one hand, we accept the second requirement from above:

ii.	When we are not in one of the four specified circumstances, we may engage in non-harmful activities of our own choice.

Less formally, we feel that what we ordinarily call ‘charitable activity’ is in fact entirely optional, and we need not feel any regrets or shame, or suffer any self-criticism, because we are not doing more for others than what is demanded by the lax rules above.  And yet we also feel that:

iii.	Even when we are not in one of the four specified circumstances, we must sometimes or always promote the good of others.

Less formally, we might say that people who devote themselves to doing more good are morally superior to us, not merely because they are more caring, sympathetic, and so on, but because in some sense we have an obligation to act as they are acting.  This intuition, (iii), conflicts with intuition (ii).  
	Not everyone would agree that ordinary morality is conflicted in this way.  For example, some might dismiss any conflicting intuitions as not reflective of ordinary morality, but rather of some theoretical worry that arises once we focus on whether our ordinary instincts make sense.  That viewpoint will not be addressed here, because there is little point in arguing about what intuitions one ought to have—either one has them or one does not.  Instead, from here onward it will be assumed that ordinary morality is conflicted, and the focus will be on the question of how to produce a theory that vindicates this conflicted aspect of ordinary morality.  The aim is to show that the theory not only vindicates this aspect, but is quite interesting in its own right.
The case begins with a brief summary of a debate that has occurred over the past thirty years.  It is a debate about consequentialism, and it has resulted in the development of the kind of theory to be discussed later on.


2     Integrity and Integrity Theories

2.1     The Integrity Explanation for the Falsity of Consequentialism

One enticing ethical theory is the most straightforward sort of consequentialism: maximizing act-consequentialism which is not agent-relative.  But consequentialism of this sort (hereafter simply ‘consequentialism’) also seems overly demanding.  As a result of these two facts, many non-consequentialists feel the need to explain why we aren’t required to maximize the good.  
One explanation that has received a great deal of attention is the Integrity Explanation:  Agents have projects and interests—for example, commitments to saving the whales, or to their hobby of performing prestidigitation.  Engaging in our personal projects rarely, if ever, constitutes maximizing the agent-neutral good, and in certain (perhaps hypothetical) circumstances would never constitute maximizing the good.  In light of this, consequentialism might always require agents to abandon their projects, no matter how deeply the agents were committed to them.  However, restricting us to a choice between pursuing our own projects and being immoral would alienate us from our projects and take away our integrity.  Since morality must not take away our integrity, morality must allow us the option to pursue our own projects and interests. So consequentialism is false.
	Thus described, the Integrity Explanation is both unclear and controversial.  
It is unclear in two respects.  First, it does not say what morality must leave room for us to do.  Morality might have to leave room for us to pursue our deeply-valued projects, or it might also have to leave room for us to pursue our trivial interests as well.  Second, it does not say how much room it must leave for us to do these things.  It might have to allow us to pursue some of our deeply-valued projects or whims, or it might have to allow us to pursue every project and whim. 
Moreover, no matter what form the Integrity Explanation takes, it will also be controversial.  Here, no defense has been given of the crucial claim that morality must not take away our integrity.  Providing such a defense is not a trivial task.​[3]​  Moreover, Shelley Kagan has raised questions about whether or not the claims of the Integrity Explanation are consistent. He alleges that if morality must protect our integrity, this implies that we are sometimes required to pursue our projects and interests, rather than being allowed to.​[4]​  
The question whether the Integrity Explanation can be defended is a challenging one, but the goal is not to address it here.  Instead it will henceforth be presupposed that the claims of the Integrity Explanation are correct.  The principal purpose is to examine the moral theories that have arisen as a result of this debate about consequentialism and integrity.

2.2     Integrity Theories

The Integrity Explanation consists, at bottom, of the claim that morality must not take away our integrity.  This claim is not itself a moral theory.  Instead it is an explanation of why certain demanding moral theories, like consequentialism, are false.  However, embracing the Integrity Explanation can easily lead one to a moral theory.  Suppose one accepted consequentialism as a ‘default’ moral position—i.e., as a position which is to be modified only insofar as the Integrity Explanation requires.  If one then fleshed out the crucial concepts employed in that explanation (i.e., if one decided what projects morality must allow us to pursue, and to what extent), one would arrive at a moral theory.  The theories that might arise from this procedure can be called Integrity Theories.  They would say, roughly, that in certain circumstances we may pursue our own projects and interests, and that in other circumstances we must maximize the good.
Note, moreover, that because discussion of the Integrity Explanation has historically arisen during debates about consequentialism, the most obvious way to formulate an Integrity Theory is by taking consequentialism as the default.  But one need not do so.  Suppose one accepted some other moral theory as one’s default.  If that moral theory was so demanding as to require substantial sacrifice of our projects and interests, then one could claim that that theory must be modified, since it takes away our integrity.  After the modifications were carried out, the result would be an Integrity Theory of a different sort.
In what follows consequentialism will be treated as the default moral position, but this is only for ease of exposition.  For present purposes it is not important to figure out what the correct default moral position is.  As will be argued in the next section, any Integrity Theory has a very interesting feature: it contains relievable obligations.  It is this feature which will allow it to vindicate ordinary morality.

2.3     Relievable Obligations

In order to clarify some notions, let us consider a garden-variety ethical theory, the lax and unconflicted version of ordinary morality spelled out at the very beginning of this paper.  That moral theory said that in certain specific circumstances—e.g., when we had made an overt agreement to help someone—we were required to promote the good of others.  These requirements to promote the good are what may be called unrelievable, because there is nothing the people under the requirement can do to rid themselves of the requirement other than fulfilling it.  Of course, the requirement may disappear for some other reason—e.g., it may be overridden by a stronger moral requirement, or the person who is the object of the requirement may release the obliged party from the requirement.  But the requirement is not relievable, because the only way for the obligated party to escape moral wrong is by fulfilling the requirement itself.  For example, if a person makes a promise to take a friend to the airport, he cannot do anything that will relieve him of this requirement other than fulfilling his promise.  The friend may release him from the requirement, or there may be a stronger moral requirement that overrides the requirement—e.g., the possibility of saving a life instead.  But as far as the obliged party is concerned, his only way to be rid of the requirement is by taking the friend to the airport.
	The lax and unconflicted version of ordinary morality also said that whenever we were not in one of the specific circumstances that triggered an (unrelievable) requirement, we could engage in any non-harmful course of action we choose.  It thus contained agent-centered prerogatives of an unlimited sort—“unlimited” because they are prerogatives to do whatever non-harmful action one might like.  
	Compare this moral theory to Integrity Theories.  Integrity Theories may also contain some unrelievable obligations, because they do not always need to make room for you to pursue your own projects and interests.  (For example, Integrity Theories might say that if you can save four million people with little cost to yourself, you must—no option.)  It is also being assumed here that, for the reasons given by other authors, Integrity Theories will generate agent-centered prerogatives. Note, however, that these prerogatives will be of a special sort.  They will not be the unlimited prerogatives considered earlier.  Instead they will be limited, because they are prerogatives to do specific things—pursue your own projects and interests.  
	Now because the prerogatives of Integrity Theories are limited, an interesting issue arises: what if a person is in a situation where he could permissibly exercise his prerogative not to pursue the good, but doesn’t pursue the particular actions sanctioned by the prerogative (his own projects and interests)?  The answer is that the person is required to promote the good, since this is the default requirement of the theory.​[5]​  Moreover, and importantly, this requirement will be of a special sort.  It will be relievable because the person can rid himself of it by some means other than fulfilling the requirement—viz., by pursuing his own projects instead.
These points about the differences between Integrity Theories and other theories can be clarified by means of a pair of contrasting examples.  First, imagine that a person is not in some special circumstance that triggers an unrelievable obligation.  Imagine as well that he is pursuing an important project or interest.  In this case, the lax standards and the Integrity theory agree: each tells us that his conduct is permissible. 
In contrast, imagine that a person is not in some special circumstance which triggers an unrelievable obligation.  Imagine as well that he is engaging in some activity that is not harmful to others, but that doesn’t promote his own interests, projects, or happiness.  For example, imagine that a person is lazing about on his bed, staring idly at the ceiling, and considering whether to get up and go to the gym.  He knows that whenever he faces these decisions, he is always reluctant to get up and go, but that he always feels better after he does and feels guilty if he doesn’t.  And yet instead of getting up, he simply lies there.  Is this permissible?  
The lax standards described earlier would say that his lying on the bed is perfectly permissible.  He is not in one of the specific situations that triggers an (unrelievable) requirement to promote the good of others, so he has an unlimited prerogative to perform whatever non-harmful action he wants.  However, an Integrity Theory would give a different verdict.  It would say that he may not simply lie on the bed but instead has only a limited prerogative to pursue his own projects and interests.  Since he isn’t pursuing a project or interest, he comes under a relievable obligation to maximize the good.  He should promote the good of others, but he can escape from that requirement if he changes his ways and begins pursuing his own projects and interests.

2.4     Objections and Clarifications

The entire argument of the paper is not yet complete, but an important step has been established: that Integrity Theories generate relievable obligations.  Before moving on, several notes should be made about the reasoning that backs this step.
	(1) It has been argued that Integrity Theories generate relievable obligations—i.e., obligations to promote the good that can be relieved by pursuing our own projects.  But do they?  Another way to describe the situation is to say that Integrity Theories generate disjunctive obligations to promote the good or pursue one’s own projects.  For example, instead of having an obligation to promote the good that is relievable, perhaps the bed-loafer has a disjunctive obligation to pursue his own projects or promote the good.  
	That characterization is possible, but it is better to resist framing the matter in terms of disjunctive obligations, since that understanding of the situation would imply that every time one pursues a project or some bit of happiness, one is fulfilling a moral obligation.  And yet that seems intuitively wrong, largely because even though there may be moral duties to improve the self, it seems as though morality is not a set of rules that mandates (say) the pursuit of trivial bits of my happiness.  For reasons too complex to discuss here, such things are just not the concern of morality.
	(2) In the case considered above, it was assumed that the standards of ordinary morality did not require the bed-loafer to do anything; he was permitted to loaf on the bed.  However, one might think that he is in the position to do a great good with little cost or inconvenience, and hence (according to the standards of ordinary morality) has an obligation to bring about this good.  
	This is a deep issue that goes beyond this example, because there are serious philosophical questions about why all of us aren’t regularly able to bring about ‘great goods’ with ‘little cost or inconvenience’.  Here it is assumed that whatever ‘great good’ and ‘little cost or inconvenience’ come to, most of us, including the bed-loafer, aren’t placed under any obligation by ordinary morality.  The reason for making that assumption is that, for whatever reason, ordinary morality is usually taken to be lax enough that it does not forbid activities like loafing about on the bed.
	(3) Some readers might object to this argument by saying that lying on the bed does promote the loafer’s happiness, since he is at the very least doing what he wants to do—even if his choice is irrational.  This paper assumes otherwise; he’s not promoting his own happiness.  However, it is not worth arguing over the details of this particular case.  For the argument to work, all that readers need to be able to imagine is an activity which (a) doesn’t promote a person’s projects or happiness, (b) isn’t harmful, and (c) isn’t performed in one of the four situations described earlier. Given that, it can be shown that Integrity Theories are importantly different from ordinary morality in that they don’t allow activities like loafing and instead place people like the bed-loafer under a relievable obligation.
	(4) Finally, consider an objection based in the work of Michael Slote.​[6]​  Slote pointed out that Integrity Theories seemingly cannot vindicate ordinary morality, because Integrity Theories only give us permission to pursue projects and interests, whereas ordinary morality allows us to pursue ‘any innocent project whatever’—e.g., loafing on the bed.​[7]​  It has now been conceded that Integrity Theories can’t justify loafing on the bed, and thus someone might object in the following way:  It’s pointless to go on and discuss whether Integrity Theories can vindicate the subtle features of ordinary morality, like our seemingly conflicting intuitions about helping others.  After all, even if some of the subtle features can be vindicated, we still can’t vindicate a fundamental feature—namely, the permission to pursue any innocent project whatever.
	In response, one can try to show that it’s not terribly troubling if Integrity Theories can’t vindicate activities like loafing on the bed.​[8]​  Our (alleged) prerogative to loaf is one that most people have mixed feelings about, because it’s not clear that it’s morally acceptable to loaf on the bed.  Moreover, this is not a free-floating moral intuition.  Instead, on most moral theories—and perhaps on any plausible moral theory—loafing on the bed is problematic.  Though specific arguments are beyond the scope of this paper, there is reason to think that such activity will be problematic for consequentialist theories, as well as for Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian theories, all of which will single out at least some loafing for a distinctive kind of moral criticism (a failure to obey the duty of self-perfection; sloth or laziness; or lack of some other virtue, such as industriousness).  Whether such theories rule out loafing altogether is debatable.  However, in the end the right theory may, and thus the alleged flaw in Integrity Theories may not be a real flaw after all.  Integrity Theories cannot vindicate the permission to pursue any innocent project whatever, but those cases are subject to dispute.  In contrast, Integrity Theories can vindicate a permission to pursue projects and interests, and those are the paradigm, uncompromised cases that we should expect any theory to vindicate.   
	None of these remarks are decisive, but they constitute at least some response to the objection grounded in Slote’s work.  The next section returns to the main subject of this paper: the question of how to reconcile our conflicting intuitions about our duty to pursue the greater good.  It will be argued that, because Integrity Theories make room for relievable obligations, they could vindicate our conflicted conception of ordinary morality.  


3     Vindicating A Conflicted Conception of Ordinary Morality

3.1     “Vindication”

What would it mean for Integrity Theories to vindicate a conflicted conception of ordinary morality?  If ordinary morality were a consistent set of principles, it would be clear what it would mean for an Integrity Theory to be able to ‘vindicate’ ordinary morality.  It would have to be the case that, once its crucial notions of ‘making room for our projects’ and so on were spelled out, it implied that the principles and intuitions of ordinary morality were at least largely correct.  But this same notion of ‘vindicate’ cannot be employed if the project is to vindicate a set of conflicting moral intuitions.  Recall that ordinary morality’s positive duties were characterized using three claims:

i.	We are required to promote the good of others in four circumstances (agreements, relations, great good at little cost, imperfect duty to help the worst off).
ii.	When we are not in one of these four circumstances, we may engage in non-harmful activities of our own choice.
iii.	Even when we are not in one of the four circumstances, we must sometimes promote the good of others.

Given that (ii) and (iii) are seemingly contradictory, no one would try to ‘vindicate’ ordinary morality if this meant showing both that our intuitions are correct and that they are contradictory.  So how is one to deal with these seemingly true and conflicting intuitions?  One way is to simply deny that one of the intuitions is correct.  Call this dissolution.  (It will come up again later in the paper.)  Another is to show that the intuitions, or something substantially similar, are all true but not contradictory.  Call this substantiation.  
The next section argues that an Integrity Theory could substantiate our intuitions about ordinary morality in the way just defined.  More specifically, it will be argued that by drawing on the possibility of a relievable obligation, proponents of Integrity Theories could explain how something substantially similar to the ordinary intuitions could actually be compatible; and that there is some way to spell out the Theory’s crucial notions of ‘making room for one’s projects’ and so on, in such a way that the intuitions, so understood, would in fact be correct.  

3.2     Why An Integrity Theory Could Vindicate Ordinary Morality

Ordinary morality has been characterized as consisting in three intuitions:

i.	We are required to promote the good of others in four circumstances (agreements, relations, great good at little cost, imperfect duty to help the worst off).
ii.	When we are not in one of these four circumstances, we may engage in non-harmful activities of our own choice.
iii.	Even when we are not in one of the four circumstances, we must sometimes promote the good of others.

Each must be substantiated.  Let us consider each in turn: 
	First, intuition (i).  As noted previously, Integrity Theories need not always make room for us to pursue our own projects.  Instead Integrity Theories can place limits on that pursuit by sometimes requiring that we promote the greater good rather than our own interests.  More specifically, depending on how the key concepts of Integrity Theories are filled out, those theories may substantiate intuition (i)—that we have unrelievable requirements to promote the good when we have made an agreement to, when we can do so at little cost, and so on.
	Second, intuition (ii).  As was noted several times, Integrity Theories don’t vindicate ordinary morality’s prerogative to do any non-harmful activity one wants; instead they only countenance the prerogative to pursue one’s projects and interests.  And so, strictly speaking, they require the denial of intuition (ii).  However, Integrity Theorists can at least preserve something very like our ordinary intuition.  For while they cannot say that we may do anything when we are not in the special circumstances described in condition (i), they can say that we can always pursue our own projects and interests when we are not in those conditions.  This preserves our sense that we are not constantly required to pursue the greater good.  
	Third, intuition (iii).  By drawing on the concept of a relievable obligation, Integrity Theories can explain why intuition (iii) is fundamentally correct but not in conflict with intuition (ii).  In a theory without relievable obligations, intuition (iii) must be read this way: 

iii.	Even when we are not in one of the four circumstances, we may have an unrelievable obligation to promote the good of others.

And that is incompatible with any reading of (ii), including the modified reading proffered by Integrity Theories.  But Integrity Theories, with their relievable obligations, can interpret intuition (iii) this way:

iii.	Even when we are not in one of the four circumstances, we may have a relievable obligation to promote the good of others.

In other words, Integrity Theorists can interpret (iii) as the recognition that we often waste time on things other than our projects and interests—that money runs through our fingers, wasted; or that we loaf sloth-like in bed instead of doing something that would make us happy—and that in those times we have a relievable obligation to promote the greater good.  This interpretation of (iii) does not conflict with the idea that, at such times, we always retain the prerogative to pursue our own projects and interests, and thus does not conflict with the Integrity Theorists’ interpretation of (ii).  
	In sum, by drawing on the concept of a relievable obligation, Integrity Theories can substantiate intuitions (i)-(iii). 
	
3.2     Objections

There are two important objections to the preceding vindication:
	(1) Someone might object that we do not have an amorphous, detached belief that we ought to be doing more good sometimes, or even a specific belief that we should be promoting the good instead of lying catatonic in bed.  Instead we feel we should be promoting the good even when we are engaging in our most-valued projects.  For example, consider the following common feeling among philosophers. Almost all of them seem to feel from time to time that instead of doing something as recherché as philosophy, they ought to be doing something for humanity’s benefit—i.e., that they ought to be benefiting humanity instead of pursuing a deeply-valued project.  But this intuition hasn’t been vindicated by the Integrity Theory.  All it has explained is why we might feel that we should pursue the good of others when we are not pursuing our projects.
There are many possible responses to this objection.  One would be to reject the intuition that we ought to be promoting the good even when we are engaging in our most-valued projects.  But as noted above, there is little point in arguing over intuitions. 
It is true that, in the midst of pursuing some central activity of one’s life, one often feels that one should be promoting the good instead.  But it is not clear that this intuition is properly described as the intuition that one should be promoting the good rather than pursuing a project one values deeply.  Take again the example of the lamenting philosophers.  Such philosophers often say things like: “What is the point of producing papers that are read by only six people?”  That does not sound like a claim that one ought to give up a deeply-valued project. Instead it sounds like the claim that one is pursuing a project that one perhaps ought not to value deeply at all.  But if that is right, then individuals who express these worries are not conflicted about the permissibility of pursuing a project they value deeply.  Instead they are conflicted about the value of the project itself.  
(2) A second and related objection is that no matter what is said about specific examples of conflicted feelings, the Integrity Theory’s vindication will not resolve a deep paradox about ordinary morality: the paradox of supererogation.  Let us assume that the Integrity Theory allows us to pursue our own projects in a certain circumstance.  In those same circumstances, there will be other people who forego their projects and pursue the greater good instead.  We will be inclined to regard such people as morally superior to us in some way.  And yet how can that be, given that we are both doing things that are permissible but not required?  As Christopher New put the problem:

…it is hard to understand why saints and heroes are held up as paradigms of human virtue, if we are under no obligation whatsoever to try to do likewise.  It is not enough to say that we extol them only to encourage people to imitate them, not to require them to do so….  For why should we encourage people to be saintly and heroic if we do not think they ought to be so?​[9]​  

	The paradox is real, and it arises whenever one countenances prerogatives to refrain from the best possible action and simultaneously regards those who do the best as morally superior.  Moreover, it is hard to see that Integrity Theories offer any special resources for resolving the paradox.  What can be said is that the paradox is not a problem that arises only for Integrity Theories.  They have not resolved it, just as they have not resolved all other puzzles about ordinary morality.  Still, as the argument of this paper shows, Integrity Theories can at least resolve one central puzzle about conflicting intuitions.

4     Conclusions

This paper is meant to be one step in a larger quest to find a plausible moral theory that vindicates our conception of ordinary morality.  Others have argued that Integrity Theories are correct and that they can generate agent-centered prerogatives to pursue one’s own projects and interests.​[10]​  Here, this work is extended in three respects.  First, ordinary morality has been shown to be conflicted in ways that these theorists have not noted.  Furthermore, it has been shown that the agent-centered prerogatives generated by Integrity Theories are limited, and thus such theories contain relievable obligations.  Most importantly, it has been argued that because Integrity Theories contain relievable obligations, they can vindicate a seemingly conflicted conception of ordinary morality.
	In closing, several notes should be made about the limitations and importance of these conclusions.
	The first is that, in this paper, it is not been asserted that the only conflict in ordinary morality is between its lax requirements and its requirement that we promote the agent-neutral good.  For example, it’s possible that the four lax requirements might conflict on their own, or that there are conflicts between the four lax requirements and the deontological restrictions that also make up part of ordinary morality.  If so, then a fuller vindication of ordinary morality would have to resolve such conflicts in other ways.  
	Second, and more generally, ordinary morality has many aspects, and the point of this paper is not to show that all of them are vindicated by Integrity Theories.  They probably cannot be.  Instead, believers in Integrity Theories will inevitably have to give up on some aspects of ordinary morality.  Still, something vital has been shown here—namely, that the Integrity Theories can (i) explain why something like our seemingly contradictory intuitions about promoting the agent-neutral good are not really contradictory, and (ii) explain why each of them, properly understood, is correct.  
	Third, it should be noted that throughout this paper it has been assumed that the Integrity Theory, if correct, implies that there are some situations in which we would be required to maximize the good.  In that way the particular version of Integrity Theory discussed here is arguably different from ordinary morality, since it is arguable that ordinary morality never requires that we maximize the good.  Now perhaps it is best to accept this implication and change our views about morality.  However, it should be noted that such changes are not required by Integrity Theories.  In section 2.2, the text discusses the possibility that the default moral theory (to be modified by the Integrity Explanation) doesn’t require maximization.  And if such a moral theory were modified in the ways demanded by the Integrity Explanation, then the resulting Integrity Theory might never require maximization at all.  This is a separate debate which is not settled here.
	Finally, a note should be made about a loose end from an earlier section.  It has been shown that Integrity Theories can be used to explain why something like our ordinary intuitions are all correct and not contradictory.  But another possibility, mentioned earlier, was to simply reject as false the intuition that we ought to be doing more good when we are not in certain, special circumstances.  For example, one could argue that the intuition that we ought to be doing more good results from mistakenly assuming that we have a constant pro tanto requirement to promote the good of others rather than certain, specific pro tanto requirements that arise only on specific occasions.  Or someone might argue that this misleading intuition is the result of embracing the following alluring but unsound argument: (i) one ought to do what there is most reason to do, (ii) there is more reason to devote oneself to the poor than to spend one’s life performing prestidigitation, watching television, writing philosophy, etc, and so (iii) we ought to be devoting ourselves to the poor instead of performing prestidigitation, etc.












^1	  Here and elsewhere the qualifier ‘non-harmful’ is used, because it is usually assumed that for reasons unrelated to anything discussed in this paper, certain courses of action are impermissible.  However, note that the qualifier ‘non-harmful’ is not quite right, because under certain understandings of ‘harm’, many permissible courses of action are harmful.  For example, when one person produces a better product than a competitor and drives the latter out of business, some form of harm has been done.  And when one person drives home after work and lets his car emit exhaust, he harms others, if only in a very slight way.  Deciding how to separate impermissible and permissible harms is obviously quite difficult.	It should also be noted that most people assume that the existence of these agent-centered restrictions is unrelated to the truth of the Integrity Explanation, which is discussed below.  For example, in The Rejection of Consequentialism, Samuel Scheffler argues that the Integrity Explanation justifies agent-centered prerogatives, but can’t justify agent-centered constraints.  The latter are to be justified, if at all, for some other reason.  However, a strong case can be made that the Integrity Explanation could justify constraints.  For a discussion of this position, see Paul Hurley’s “Scheffler’s Argument for Deontology.”
^2	  Samuel Scheffler has explicitly advocated an Integrity Theory, and it is arguable that it or something like it has been advocated by Bernard Williams and (despite his claim to the contrary) Michael Slote.  For Scheffler, see The Rejection of Consequentialism, esp. ch. 2; for Williams, “Integrity”; and for Slote, Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism, ch. II.  See John Harris’s “Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity” for an argument that Williams is advocating something like an Integrity Theory.  Slote advocates an explanation for the falsity of consequentialism that he believes is distinct from the Integrity Explanation discussed below, though see Dan Brock’s “Defending Moral Options” and especially Seana Shiffrin’s “Moral Autonomy and Agent-Centered Options” for reasons to think that Slote’s theory is either quite similar to an Integrity Theory or at least similar enough that much of what is said about the Integrity Theory in this paper would apply to it.
^3	  The most important argument comes from Scheffler.  Instead of merely asserting that morality must not take away our integrity, he defends and elaborates the claim using an argument that may be briefly represented as follows: (i) each of us is concerned with our projects and interests out of proportion to their weight from an impersonal point of view, (ii) the having of this personal point of view is part of the nature of a person, and (iii) “the correct regulative principle for a thing depends on the nature of that thing”.  (The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 57.  Step (iii) is affirmed by Scheffler, but credited by him to Rawls.  See Theory of Justice, p. 29.)  Another argument can be extrapolated from remarks by Shiffrin in “Moral Autonomy and Agent-Centered Options.”  When one may blamelessly and rationally choose between two different life-paths, one has made use of one’s capacity for choice and determined a future that was not independently required by the principles of rationality or morality.  It is plausible that exercising one’s capacity for choice in this way makes one’s life better because it allows one to form an identity, and thus that for such exercise to be made impossible is rightly described as a loss of an important moral value.  
^4	  See The Limits of Morality, chs. 7, 8, and 9, but esp. p. 372ff.  
^5	  The text says that Integrity Theories imply that you must promote the good when not pursuing your own projects, but strictly speaking, one ought to retain the qualifier that you must promote the good in acceptable ways—e.g., without violating deontological restrictions, if there are any.  This qualifier will be left out because, as noted in the text, this paper treats consequentialism (which has no deontological restrictions) as the default moral theory.    	The simplification is not trivial, though.  Some theorists (e.g. Williams, “Integrity”) have argued that moral theories that respect integrity will contain deontological restrictions.  Some also argue that prerogatives and restrictions go hand in hand (e.g., Hurley, “Scheffler’s Argument for Deontology”).
^6	  For Slote’s work, see Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism, ch. II.  
^7	  This is Slote’s expression; Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism, p. 29.
^8	  Another way to respond would be to argue that Integrity Theories, properly developed, will vindicate a broader set of permissions than they seem to at first glance.  For one attempt, see Rajczi, “The Value of Planning One’s Life: An Explanation of the Falsity of Act-Consequentialism and the Existence of Moral Options,”unpublished manuscript.
^9	  “Saints, Heroes, and Utilitarians,” p. 183.
^10	  Instead of wanting further evidence that Integrity Theories are correct, some might take the arguments of this paper as evidence—i.e., they might claim that the very fact that Integrity Theories vindicate ordinary morality constitutes evidence in favor of them.  However, it is better to have independent justification.  For more on those justifications, see the references in footnotes two and three.
